Will humanity survive until 2050?

As of 2026-09-08, humanity has an estimated 98% probability of surviving to January 1, 2050, with a plausible range of 94 to 99. A catastrophe killing at least 10% of the world's population is a different and more likely outcome, estimated here at 8%, with a range of 3 to 20. These are editorial judgements informed by published risk surveys, whose participants disagree sharply and mostly forecast much longer horizons. 1

Forecast

• Probability of survival: 98% (plausible range 94 to 99).
• Probability of a catastrophe killing at least 10% of the world population between the evidence cutoff and 2050: 8% (plausible range 3 to 20).
• As of: 2026-09-08, evidence cutoff and source access date.
• Resolves: 2050-01-01, through independently corroborated evidence that at least one living human exists; the catastrophe forecast uses demographic and mortality evidence from the UN, WHO and peer-reviewed research.
• Base rate: Humanity has survived roughly 200,000 years according to Toby Ord's discussion of natural risk, but that record does not measure the hazard from recently developed technologies. 2
• What would move it: Sustained improvements in disease response and international crisis control raise survival odds; repeated failures to contain dangerous autonomous systems or a major nuclear exchange lower them.

Why

1. Extinction requires every human to die. The Existential Risk Persuasion Tournament distinguishes extinction from a catastrophe killing at least 10% of the population. Its median superforecaster estimates by 2100 were about 1% and 9%, respectively; expert medians were 6% and 20%. The distinction is large enough to change what a reader should take from the headline. 1
2. Published estimates describe beliefs under deep uncertainty. The original tournament recruited 80 experts and 89 superforecasters in 2022 and reported their forecasts in 2023. Its structured disagreement is valuable evidence, but it is not a measured annual extinction rate. 3
3. Technological risks dominate the uncertainty about a short horizon. A follow-up adversarial collaboration found that opposing groups retained very different forecasts even after extensive discussion. Agreement about near-term capabilities did not automatically settle disagreement about eventual catastrophe. 4

The 98% survival estimate assigns 2% to extinction before 2050. It sits between the tournament groups' century-end extinction medians despite using a shorter horizon. That choice deliberately gives extra weight to the possibility that dangerous capabilities arrive early. It should not be mistaken for a direct average of the published numbers or a consensus forecast.

A constant-hazard conversion illustrates the sensitivity. Spreading a 6% century-end risk evenly over roughly 78 years would produce about a 2% risk across 24 years. Spreading a 1% risk in the same way would produce well below 1%. The 2% estimate therefore lies toward the more concerned end of that simple comparison. Constant hazard is only a reference calculation; the timing of technological change makes it a doubtful literal description of the next two decades.

For the 10% mortality event, the 8% estimate allows severe disasters that leave large surviving populations. The risks cannot simply be added across causes. A conflict can damage disease surveillance, food trade and emergency response together. A single chain of events must count once, even when several hazards contribute. The broad range reflects those dependencies and the absence of a reliable historical sample of comparable global disasters.

Evidence for

• Ord describes natural risk as constrained by humanity's long survival record, while putting his overall existential-risk estimate at one in six over the next century. His definition includes permanent destruction of humanity's potential, so that number is broader than literal extinction and has a longer horizon than this report. It is a warning against both zero risk and careless comparison. 2
• WHO's May 2022 release estimates 14.9 million excess deaths associated with the pandemic during 2020 and 2021. This is an enormous disaster, but it demonstrates that a global health emergency and human extinction are different orders of outcome. It does not establish an upper bound for a future pathogen. 5
• On May 20, 2025, WHO member states adopted a Pandemic Agreement. Its provisions address coordination and access to health products, while the adoption notice also describes further implementation steps. Institutional preparation is evidence of a capacity to respond, although a signed text alone is not proof of operational readiness. 6
• NASA's Sentry system scans observed asteroid trajectories for possible impacts over the next 100 years. This is an example of an identifiable hazard with a dedicated warning system. The opened page explains the system; it does not justify declaring that every possible object has been found or that the current risk table is empty. 7

Evidence against

• SIPRI's June 2025 assessment warns of a renewed nuclear arms race and weakened arms-control arrangements. It reports that Russia and the United States together hold about 90% of nuclear weapons. Concentrated destructive capacity makes decisions by a small number of governments relevant to the global catastrophe estimate. 8
• The autonomous-systems disagreement study did not converge on a reassuring shared estimate. Its selected groups differed over both the development of powerful systems and society's ability to respond. These are substantive unresolved questions. They support a wide range, rather than a claim that more discussion has already removed the danger. 4
• The pandemic agreement's adoption notice explicitly left further steps before entry into force. This report credits the existence of a cooperative framework without assuming that all its intended capabilities were operational by September 2026. The latest directly verified institutional fact here is the 2025 adoption, not a claim about subsequent ratifications. 6

Assumptions and limits

• Survival means at least one living biological human at 00:00 UTC on January 1, 2050. It does not promise a functioning civilisation, political freedom, population growth or acceptable living standards. A devastated world with survivors resolves the main question yes.
• The secondary forecast covers a single catastrophe or causally connected episode beginning after September 8, 2026 and causing deaths before the resolution date. Deaths must reach 10% of the population immediately before that episode. Ordinary mortality accumulated over decades does not qualify, and overlapping causes must not duplicate the same deaths.
• These forecasts are informed judgements, not verified September 2026 survey results. Most quantitative evidence comes from work published in 2023 to 2025; the pandemic mortality estimate concerns 2020 and 2021. No current Metaculus community percentage is asserted because a suitable dated observation was not verified.
• Extinction cannot be resolved by a surviving observer in the ordinary way. A communications failure must not be treated as proof that all humans have died. The evidence standard for yes is much easier than for no, and catastrophic disruption could delay adjudication.

What to watch

• At annual reviews through 2049, compare forecasts with observed containment failures, crisis-management capacity and independently tested emergency preparations. A changing capability matters more than a dramatic public statement.
• Track implementation evidence for pandemic cooperation and changes in nuclear deployment and command arrangements. Update the relevant risk channels when concrete evidence appears, then reconsider their dependence. By January 1, 2050, keep survival and mass mortality as separate outcomes even if both can be resolved from the same catastrophe.

Sources

1. Assessing Near-Term Accuracy in the Existential Risk Persuasion Tournament, Forecasting Research Institute, 2025-09-02, accessed 2026-09-08, https://forecastingresearch.org/research/near-term-xpt-accuracy
2. Frequently Asked Questions, Toby Ord / The Precipice, accessed 2026-09-08; publication day not exposed, https://theprecipice.com/faq
3. Forecasting Existential Risks: Evidence from a Long-Run Forecasting Tournament, Forecasting Research Institute, 2023-07-10, revised 2023-08-08, https://forecastingresearch.org/research/existential-risk-persuasion-tournament
4. Roots of Disagreement on AI Risk, Forecasting Research Institute, accessed 2026-09-08; reports collaboration conducted 2023-04-01 to 2023-05-31, https://forecastingresearch.org/research/roots-of-disagreement-on-ai-risk
5. 14.9 million excess deaths associated with the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 and 2021, WHO, 2022-05-05, https://www.who.int/japan/news/detail-global/05-05-2022-14.9-million-excess-deaths-were-associated-with-the-covid-19-pandemic-in-2020-and-2021
6. World Health Assembly adopts historic Pandemic Agreement, WHO, 2025-05-20, https://www.who.int/news/item/20-05-2025-world-health-assembly-adopts-historic-pandemic-agreement-to-make-the-world-more-equitable-and-safer-from-future-pandemics
7. Sentry: Earth Impact Monitoring, NASA/JPL CNEOS, accessed 2026-09-08; living monitoring documentation, https://cneos.jpl.nasa.gov/sentry/
8. Nuclear risks grow as new arms race looms: new SIPRI Yearbook out now, SIPRI, 2025-06-16, https://www.sipri.org/media/press-release/2025/nuclear-risks-grow-new-arms-race-looms-new-sipri-yearbook-out-now